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FEDERAL COURTS, TRIBAL COURTS, AND COMITY:
DEVELOPING TRIBAL JUDICIARIES AND FORUM SELECTION
Raymond L. Niblock
I. INTRODUCTION
The original legal systems of the American Indian tribes differed
greatly from each other as well as from those of the European settlers.
These systems differed in form as well as in substance.
Given the political nature of tribes having no established geographic
boundaries, so, too, the jurisdiction of their legal systems had no established
boundaries. As colonialism progressed, so did cession of territory which
restricted the territorial jurisdiction of tribes to the reservations that exist
today.1
Within tribal territory, a number of current federal limitations have
added to the difficulty in maintaining many of the traditional legal systems
previously in place. Yet other forces, in existence well before federal
limitations, had already begun to weaken and overwhelm the traditional
systems. For example, European contact and the work of missionaries had
a paramount impact, disrupting the traditional economies and introducing
new technology.2
As the presence and influence of whites increased, evidenced by federal
efforts to induce tribes to adopt representative governments, so progressed
the disappearance of the traditional tribal systems. As the United States
developed, the economic and social pressures of the nation also brought
influence upon the tribes to adopt representative governments.3 This facet
has been recognized by some tribal courts. For example, the Navajo
Supreme Court has stated: "People living on [reservations] face [many]
social and economic situations unlike those faced in Anglo-America.
Therefore... court[s must] consider those unique situations when deciding
controversies that are particular to that... Nation."4
The purpose of this article is to examine tribal judicial systems in an
historical context, to argue for the development of tribal judiciaries, separate
and distinct from the federal judicial system, and to present a general
* Raymond L. Niblock received his bachelors degree from the University of New
Mexico in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in 1989. Later, in 1994, he earned hisjuris doctor
from the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville. In 1994 he was licensed to practice in both
New Mexico and Arkansas, where he maintains a solo law practice. His practice is primarily
focused on civil litigation in both State and Federal courts.
1. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 332 (1982).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 333.
4. Begay v. Navajo Nation, 15 Indian L. Rep. 6032, 6034 (Navajo 1988).
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guideline for determining in what court a civil action involving Indian tribe
members or territory should be filed. But to do so, a number of issues and
doctrines must be considered---two of these being comity and notions of
tribal sovereignty. These principles, comity and sovereignty, are distinct, but
involve overlapping aspects.
A. The Doctrine of Comity and Indian Law
The doctrine of comity, in the context of civil jurisdiction, between a
federal court and a tribal court, is significant in any examination of tribal
judiciaries. The issue is whether the tribal court ought to have first
opportunity to determine its jurisdiction in cases where it has already
asserted itself, or ought to have asserted itself, but the matter is properly
before a federal court. The discussion is confined to federal-tribal relations
in matters of civil jurisdiction. State-tribal relations are excluded from the
discussion, as are issues of criminal jurisdiction. Criminal jurisdiction is
entirely another matter, one that is considerably regulated by Congress;
whereas, matters of tribal civil jurisdiction have not received definitive
treatment by Congress or the federal courts. Where comity is concerned, the
treatment by Congress is non-existent, and the treatment by the federal
judiciary is limited, leaving the field open for development.
1. Definition of Comity
Comity . . . Courtesy; complaisance; respect; a willingness to grant a
privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will.
Recognition that one sovereignty allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial act of another sovereignty, having due
regard to rights of its own citizens. . . In general, the principle of
'comity' is that courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to laws
and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of
obligation but out of deference and mutual respect.'
The doctrine of comity relates to the amount of respect federal courts
ought to accord tribal courts in their assertions of tribal civil jurisdiction
over matters in which concurrent jurisdiction between federal government
and the tribe might exist. In other words, the question is whether a federal
court should abstain from hearing a matter and allow, or force, a plaintiff to
bring the matter before a tribal court, whether the action was originally
brought in federal court or not, where Congress has not expressly limited the
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
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tribe's jurisdiction. One concern that must be remembered, however, is that
this doctrine is discretionary. A federal court confronted with comity
concerns is not obligated to consider them. Some of the decisions discussed
in this article appear to have elevated the doctrine of federal-tribal comity
to that of a mandate.
2. Comity is Not a Jurisdictional Determination
Comity concerns and jurisdictional issues are two separate questions;
however, the two topics are not mutually exclusive. Comity deals with how
much respect a federal court should accord a tribal court in its initial
determination of jurisdiction, even where the federal court may share
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, by contrast, refers to the power and authority of a
court to adjudicate a claim.
The courts have given comity relatively little treatment beyond the two
Supreme Court comity cases seminalis, National Farmers Union Insurance
v. Crow Tribe of Indians6 and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante7
These cases will be examined regarding their impact on federal and Indian
relations-specifically upon the respective judiciaries.
B. Fundamental Premise: Tribal Sovereignty
Sovereignty has many facets, and few authorities agree on a single
definition. However, it is recognized that sovereignty is "supreme political
authority; ... [t]he power to do everything in a state without accountabil-
ity."98
One hundred and fifty years ago, Chief Justice Marshall held in
Worcester v. Georgia9 that Indian nations were "distinct political communi-
ties, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive
.... 1110 Today, the generally accepted view is that the various Indian tribes,
within the borders of the United States, retain certain incidents of sover-
eignty that are inherent in them. This "right of tribes to govern their
members and territories flows from a pre-existing sovereignty which is
limited, but not abolished, by their inclusion within the territorial bounds of
6. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
7. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
9. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
10. Id. at 557.
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the United States."" Assuming the tribe is recognized, the "tribe retains its
sovereignty until Congress acts to divest that sovereignty."' 2
The critical concept here, and truly a most basic principle of all Indian
law, is that those powers which are vested in an Indian tribe are not
delegated or granted to them by express acts of Congress; rather, those
powers are "inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished."' 3 This fundamental principle of recognizing the tribes'
inherent sovereignty where not limited or withdrawn by treaty or statutes,
"or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status,"'4 is well
recognized by the United States Supreme Court.' 5
As fundamental precepts, then, we have established that the tribes are
sovereign over their own members and over events within their territory,
unless that sovereignty has been expressly limited by treaty, express
Congressional act, or by the Supreme Court. This concept, combined with
the principle of comity, provides the essential context within which the
discussion of developing Indian judiciaries must occur.
II. FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY AND TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION
A. Historical Perspective
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia6 and Worcester v. Georgia,7 Chief
Justice Marshall espoused that the "American Indian peoples comprised
nations domestic to and dependent upon the United States. They occupied
a status of 'quasi-sovereignty' . . ., being sovereign enough to engage in
treaty-making with the U.S...., but not sovereign enough to manage their
other affairs as fully independent entities."'" This had the effect of laying the
groundwork for the "plenary power doctrine," which means that the federal
government would assume full and inherent power over Indian affairs and
a concomitant "trust responsibility" over all Indian assets.' 9
11. COHEN, supra note 1, at 231.
12. COHEN, supra note 1, at 231 (citing Harjo v. Kleppe,.420 F. Supp. 1110 (D.D.C.
1976), affd sub nom. Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
13. COHEN, supra note 1, at 231 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-
23 (1978)).
14. COHEN, supra note 1, at 231 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323).
15. See generally, Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 313; Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribes, 435
U.S. 191 (1978).
16. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
17. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
18. Ward Churchill & Glenn T. Morris, Indian Laws and Cases, in The State of Native
America 19 (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992).
19. Id.
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In 1896, Justice White's opinion in Talton v. Mayes' recognized
Congress' plenary power, opining that "[t]rue it is that in many adjudica-
tions of this court the fact has been fully recognized, that although possessed
of these attributes of local self government, when exercising their tribal
functions, all such rights are subject to the supreme legislative authority of
the United States." '21 The Plenary Power Doctrine was the primary basis by
which Congress and the Supreme Court unilaterally divested the several
tribes of many aspects of their inherent sovereignty. The consequences of
those unilateral acts embodied in various federal policies can be summed up
as "assimilationist"---Allotment, Assimilation, Relocation, and Termination.
B. Shifting Policy
In 1977, the American Indian Policy Review Commission "called for
a firm rejection of assimilationist policies and reaffirmation of the status of
tribes as permanent, self-governing institutions .... . 22 By then, the federal
government had shifted to a policy of advancing tribal self-determination
after the previous policies of termination and assimilation were regarded as
failures and began to fade.
The chief result of this change in federal Indian policy was the passage
of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.23 This Act imposed upon the tribes
most of the requirements of the Bill of Rights, whereas, traditionally, the
tribes had not been subject to Constitutional restraints in their governmental
actions.24 Although the Act worked a further reduction of tribal sovereignty
by thrusting portions of the Bill of Rights upon the tribes, it also amended
Public Law 28025 which cut in favor of advancing tribal sovereignty.
The amendment of Public Law 280 prohibited states from assuming
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country. 6 Public Law 280
originally allowed states to unilaterally assume jurisdiction over matters in
Indian country, but its amendment added the requirement of tribal consent.
The effect of the law was to put an end to further incursions by states into
areas of tribal, or federal, domain. The amendment removed the states as
interested parties, as a matter of competence, in the determination of
20. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
21. Id. at 384.
22. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 31 (2d ed. 1988).
23. 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 25 of the United
States Code).
24. See CANBY, supra note 22, at 29 (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)).
25. 67 Stat. 588 (1968).
26. See CANBY, supra note 22, at 29 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22, 1326).
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jurisdiction over Indian country, leaving the federal government and the
tribes as the sole contenders for authority.
In matters of civil jurisdiction, the division of authority between the
tribes and the federal government has not yet been fully determined. Since
civil jurisdictional concepts have yet to be developed in toto, comity
becomes important because it operates to allow tribes first opportunity to
determine their jurisdiction over matters which otherwise remain untouched
by Congress. Through the process of encouraging the tribes to assert
themselves the law in this murky area will become developed. The decisions
of the Supreme Court, up to this point, appear to have emplaced a
framework which will guide the development of tribal judiciaries, assuming
that the current federal policy of self-determination for Indian tribes remains
in effect.
C. Limits on Tribal Sovereignty
Felix Cohen states:
In matters of internal self-government within tribal territory, tribal
powers are exclusive, and federal and state powers are inapplicable,
unless such tribal powers have been limited by federal treaties, agree-
ments, or statutes. Absent a limiting treaty or federal law, tribal powers
may be exercised unfettered by assertions of federal or state authority.27
The limitations enacted by statutes and treaties are too many to enumerate,
but "obvious examples are provided by the vast land cessions made by
treaty which ended tribal power over the ceded areas. Some treaties also
contain clauses requiring tribes to permit federal supervision within their
territories. ' 28
Another area of limitations exists among those "external powers of
sovereignty [which] were implicitly lost to the tribes by virtue of their
incorporation within the United States."29 Chief Justice Marshall revealed
these propositions in Johnson v. M'Intosh3 ° and in the Cherokee Cases.
Then, in 1978, the Supreme Court decided the case of Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe.3 Justice William Rehnquist wrote the opinion,
27. COHEN, supra note 1, at 236.
28. COHEN, supra note 1, at 242.
29. COHEN, supra note 1, at 244.
30. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823). Discovery by the European nations did not
extinguish the natives' sovereignty but did necessarily diminish it. COHEN, supra note 1, at
244.
31. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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which held that the tribe did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-
members in tribal courts.
32
For this article's purposes, Oliphant serves well in the forthcoming
discussion of the doctrine of comity, because Oliphant placed significant
additional limitations on tribal sovereignty.33 Oliphant raised the issue of the
"tribe's power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on the
reservation., 34 The opinion, silent towards civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians, left unclear what limits may exist with respect to tribal civil
jurisdiction toward non-Indians or non-member Indians living on the
reservation. According to Cohen:
[u]nder these decisions, the powers implicitly lost by tribes are the power
to transfer tribal land without federal approval, the power to carry on
relations with nations other than the United States, the power to regulate
non-Indians when no tribal interest justifies such regulations, and the
power to impose criminal punishment on non-Indians.35
D. The Extent of Civil Jurisdiction
The limits of tribal powers are not readily identifiable since their
sovereignty, at least in civil matters, does not in any way rely on what the
federal government has delegated to it. As stated above, the "powers of
tribes extend 'over both their members and their territory."' 36 Although tribal
powers have been limited in a myriad of areas, particularly the area of
criminal jurisdiction, tribal civil authority over its territory and transactions
within that territory is extensive. The extent of tribal powers has not been
limited to civil disputes between non-Indians and Indians. arising from
transactions on the reservation. However, authority over these transactions
is "exclusively committed to tribal judicial jurisdiction. 37
The evolution of rules governing civil jurisdiction to Indian country has
been different from the development of rules dealing with criminal
jurisdiction. "Contrary to the rule in criminal matters, Indian tribes retain
32. Id. at 212.
33. See CANBY, supra note 22, at 69.
34. See CANBY, supra note 22, at 69.
35. COHEN, supra note 1, at 245-46.
36. COHEN, supra note 1, at 246 (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557
(1975)).
37. COHEN, supra note 1, at 246 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)).
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civil regulatory and judicial jurisdiction over non-Indians."3 As Cohen
states, an
analysis of the actions of each of the three federal branches demonstrates
that civil jurisdiction over non-Indians has not been withdrawn and that
the exercise of such jurisdiction is consistent with the tribes' dependent
status under federal law .... In the civil field, however, Congress has
never enacted general legislation to supply a federal or state forum for
disputes between Indians and non-Indians in Indian country.39
Essentially, the field remains open to development. The case law is
limited, and there are no federal enactments to guide federal courts, or tribal
courts for that matter, in determining civil jurisdiction where the jurisdiction
of both might be in question. However, this appears to assume that the tribal
courts have no say in the question of their own jurisdiction. Nothing could
be further from the truth.
The Navajo Nation's Supreme Court has taken positive steps to enforce
their civil authority, at least from the influence of the authority of the states.
In Billie v. Abbot,4° the Navajo Supreme Court prevented the State of Utah
from intercepting the federal tax refunds of Navajo Indians responsible for
child support payments through the state-funded Aid to Families with
Dependent Children. The Navajo Supreme Court relied heavily upon the
idea of self-determination in its decision.
In support of its decision, the Navajo Supreme Court cited two United
States Supreme Court decisions. The first was Williams v. Lee, where the
United States Supreme Court stated that "[i]mplicit in the Treaty of 1868 is
the understanding that the internal affairs of the Navajo people are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation government."' In the second
case, United States v. Kagama, the United States Supreme Court stated:
"[t]he sovereignty retained by an Indian tribe includes 'the power of
regulating [its] internal and social relations. '
Thus, the question of the development of tribal judiciaries does not rely
solely upon the concept of comity and the discretion of the federal courts.
Not only does comity play a role, but, as recognized by the Kagama
decision, inherent sovereignty is an important and determining factor. Indian
38. COHEN, supra note 1, at 253 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S.
134 (1980) and Williams, 358 U.S. at 223).
39. COHEN, supra note 1, at 253-54.
40. 16 Indian L. Rep. 6021 (Navajo 1988).
41. Billie v. Abbot, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6021, 6022 (Navajo 1988) (citing Williams v.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1959)).
42. Id. (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886)).
[Vol. 19
TRIBAL JUDICIARIES
nations must take active steps to enforce and enhance their own judicial
authority and powers.
E. Current Federal Policy: Advancing Tribal Development
As expressed in the Introduction, the United States government, in the
1960s, adopted the policy of advancing tribal self-determination, regarding
previous policies as failures. This belief in advancing tribal self-determina-
tion is probably more a result of the historical experience of federal
interaction with the tribes rather than some academic theory that the tribes
would be better off by retaining all, or even most of the incidents of their
inherent sovereignty. After all, the recent history of Indian affairs from the
reservation Period (1850 to 1887), through Allotment and Assimilation
(1887 to 1934), Reorganization and Tribal Preservation (1934 to 1953), and
Termination and Relocation (1953 to 1968) was dismal, 43 and President
Nixon acknowledged the failures in 1970 in a statement that "declared
termination to have been a failure." President Nixon called on Congress to
repudiate the policy.
The purpose here is not to argue on behalf of Indian sovereignty
advocates, but, rather, to show that the federal government recognized in the
1960s that permitting Indians a degree of autonomy over their affairs,
without abandoning federal trust responsibilities, would ultimately inure to
their benefit. Strengthening tribal governments is the current model, and the
federal courts have recognized this switch in federal policies by assiduous
efforts to recognize tribal courts and their province over their internal affairs
on the reservation, including the activities of non-Indians on the reservation.
F. Advancing the Tribal Judiciary
"The powers of an Indian tribe in the administration of justice derive
from the substantive powers of self-government which are legally recognized
to fall within the domain of tribal sovereignty."45 To be able to adjudicate
a claim involving applicable law is an essential element of sovereignty, self-
government, and self-determination. Thus, a critical part of promoting tribal
self-government is advancing a tribal judiciary.
43. See generally, COHEN; supra note 1, for a more extensive explanation of these
historical periods.
44. CANBY, supra note 22, at 30. See 116 CONG. REc. 23,258 (1970) for President
Nixon's statement concerning Indian policy.
45. COHEN, supra note 1, at 145.
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What good is a tribe's power to administer justice without well
developed courts to interpret tribal laws and, in some instances, interpret
federal and state laws as they might apply to tribal issues? This is a
principle of law already recognized in the United States Court System;
litigation of federal law is permitted to occur in state courts. And, what
good is the tribal court system without a cultivated tribal common-law
responsive to its own needs? The Supreme Court has, if only implicitly,
recognized that tribal courts have greater expertise in evaluating their own
problems and interests.47
The tribe's power to administer justice through its own court system is
an indispensable part of self-determination; therefore; encouraging the
development of a tribal judiciary is an essential portion of the current federal
Indian policy. Like all federal Indian law issues, comity, inextricably
interwoven among jurisdictional matters, must be balanced on the high-wire
against the plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs.
In the area of comity, the question is what amount of respect should
federal courts give to tribal court determinations of their own jurisdiction
before the federal courts allow litigation on the merits in the federal forum
instead of the tribal forum? These related questions are not easily solved,
however, because of a lack of any bright-line litmus tests for determining
jurisdiction.
G. The Supreme Court, Tribal Sovereignty, and Comity
National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians48 and
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante49 are the leading federal-tribal
comity cases. Taken together, these cases form the judicial foundation for
the advancement of a tribal judiciary.
In National Farmers Union, the respondent was a Crow Indian minor
who was struck by a motorcycle in a school parking lot located within the
Crow Indian Reservation on land owned by the State of Montana. The
respondent brought an action in the Crow Tribal Court against the petitioner
school district and obtained a default judgment5 °
46. For example, state courts can hear 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. The Tenth Circuit
recognized this principle as applicable to tribal courts in Smith v. Moffett, 947 F.2d 442
(10th Cir. 1991).
47. See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)
and Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), which are discussed infra part II.G.
48. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
49. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
50. National Farmers Union Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 845.
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In response, the school district and its insurer brought an action in
federal court for injunctive relief on the ground that the tribal court had no
civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant, and invoking the jurisdiction
of the federal court under the "federal question" statute.5 l Even though the
district court's jurisdiction was properly invoked under § 133 1, the Supreme
Court held that the petitioners ought to have exhausted the available
remedies in the tribal court first, because it would be premature for the
district court to consider any relief until the tribal court had an opportunity
to ascertain its jurisdiction. Hence, federal action should be held in abeyance
pending the completion of the tribal court proceedings. The Supreme Court
did not resolve the jurisdictional question, but deferred to the tribal court so
that it could determine its own jurisdiction in the first instance.
The Court stated that Oliphant did not control the question of the
tribe's civil jurisdiction,52 foreclosing any chance of an Oliphant argument
in civil jurisdictional disputes where a petitioner argues that "resort to
exhaustion as a matter of comity" would be "manifestly inappropriate. 5 3 In
short, the Court explained that "if we were to apply the Oliphant rule here,
it is plain that any exhaustion requirement would be completely foreclosed
because federal courts would always be the only forums for civil actions
against non-Indians. ' 4 In National Farmers Union, unlike Oliphant, there
was "no comparable legislation granting the federal courts jurisdiction over
civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians that arise on an Indian
reservation. 55
The driving force behind the National Farmers Union opinion was the
Court's unequivocal statement that allowing the tribal court's initial
examination of its jurisdiction is pursuant to current Congressional policy
of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination. Furthermore, the
Court reasoned that
the existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a
careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that
sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a
detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch-policy as embodied
in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions.56
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
52. National Farmers Union Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 854-55.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 854.
55. Id. (citing COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 253 (1982), which stated,
"The development of principles governing civil jurisdiction in Indian Country has been
markedly different from the development of rules dealing with criminal jurisdiction.").
56. Id. at 855-56.
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It is this examination, wrote Justice Stevens, that "should be conducted in
the first instance in the Tribal Court itself., 57
The Court articulated five practical reasons in support of this notion,
in addition to recognizing that "Congress is committed to a policy of
supporting tribal self-government and self-determination. 5 ' Those reasons
were: (1) giving the tribe whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first
opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal basis for the challenge; (2)
allowing development of a full record in the tribal court prior to determina-
tion of the issues on the merits or before any question concerning appropri-
ate relief is addressed; (3) minimizing the "procedural nightmare" by the
federal court staying its hand until after the tribal court has had an
opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction; (4) encouraging the tribal
court to explain its precise basis for accepting jurisdiction; and (5) providing
the federal court with the benefit of tribal court expertise in such matters in
the event of further review.59
Almost a year and a half after the National Farmers Union decision
came the case of Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante. The Iowa
Mutual case dealt with tribal jurisdiction in the context of federal diversity
jurisdiction, whereas National Farmers Union concerned the federal question
statute. The subject matter in Iowa Mutual involved, inter alia, personal
injuries in a tort claim. The plaintiff first brought his action before the tribal
court, which ruled that it did have subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
The insurance company-appellant then filed its petition in federal court
without first seeking appellate review by the Tribal Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court stayed its diversity jurisdiction to permit a tribal
court to determine its own jurisdiction over parallel litigation. Here again,
the Supreme Court did not actually decide whether the tribal court had
power to entertain a case against a non-Indian defendant, but its language
61was encouraging.
More important, however, is the emphasis Justice Marshall placed on
the policy of promoting tribal self-government. The petitioner argued that
the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction overrides the federal policy of
57. Id. at 856.
58. Id. at 856-57 (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332
(1983); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 138 n.5 (1982); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
551 (1974); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)).
59. Id. at 856-57.
60. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
61. CANBY, supra note 22, at 159.
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deference to tribal courts.62 Justice Marshall rejected the argument, opining
that 28 U.S.C. § 1332 "makes no reference to Indians and nothing in the
legislative history suggests any intent to render inoperative the established
federal policy promoting tribal self-government." 63 But Justice Marshall did
not stop there. He went on, in dicta, to suggest that civil jurisdiction over
the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is not only an important
part of tribal sovereignty, but such jurisdiction presumptively lies in the
tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by specific treaty provisions or
federal statute.64
As a last resort, the petitioner argued the "policies underlying the grant
of diversity jurisdiction-protection against local bias and incompe-
tence-justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction ..... 6' The Court replied
that the "alleged incompetence of tribal courts is not among the exceptions
to the exhaustion requirement established in National Farmers Union . ..
and would be contrary to the Congressional policy of promoting the
development of tribal courts."66  However, Justice Marshall attached a
caveat, stating that even though the "petitioner must exhaust available tribal
court remedies before instituting a suit in federal court," the tribal court's
determination of its jurisdiction is "ultimately subject to review."6 7
Taken together, National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual make clear
that the Supreme Court supports the articulated federal policies of advancing
tribal self-government through the doctrine of comity by requiring litigants
to exhaust tribal court remedies. Thus, developing a tribal judiciary is a legal
mandate. Further, in civil matters, there appears to be a strong presumption
in favor of Indian jurisdiction.
III. COMMENTATORS
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual have drawn some attention
by various commentators. For tribal advocates, it appears that both opinions
are scored as partial victories for tribal sovereignty.
62. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 12.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 978.
66. Id. at 19.
67. Id.
1997]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
A. Law Reviews
Frank Pommersheim, in Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work.- An Essay
on Tribal Court Jurisprudence,6" makes the accurate observation that both
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual "have created significant
'breathing space' for tribal courts to articulate their own version of tribal
sovereignty, while at the same time reserving significant federal judicial
authority to review much of that decision making. ' 69 As a practical matter,
Pommersheim points out that "[i]t is therefore incumbent upon tribal courts
to insure that their decision making withstands the rigors of federal
review."7° Nonetheless, Pommersheim's discussion of tribal sovereignty is
not the goal of this article. Rather, how the doctrine of comity and tribal
sovereignty fit into the total scheme of tribal jurisprudence and an under-
standing of the need for the development of tribal courts, in the context of
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, is the goal.
Pommersheim accurately sums up the problem by his statement:
Tribal courts and their jurisprudence are currently involved in a period
of rapid growth and development. As part of this process of significant
change, tribal courts need to build an indigenous jurisprudence of vision
and cultural integrity. This endeavor includes the necessity to transcend
... tribal sovereignty, and the 'dilemma of difference.'71
Given comity as an essential focus of the argument in this article, National
Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual are definitely steps away from additional
limits upon tribal sovereignty. As Pommersheim points out, the respect of
comity as a doctrine will allow tribal courts to build their own jurispru-
dence. Indeed, Pommersheim implied that these decisions almost demand a
tribal judiciary competent to hear such claims:
In both the National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual cases, the Court
ringingly endorsed the importance of tribal courts as the primary forums
in which to resolve civil disputes arising on the reservation. As Justice
Marshall wrote in Iowa Mutual, '[t]ribal courts play a vital role in tribal
self-government . . . and the Federal Government has consistently
encouraged their development.' It is the force of these most recent cases
joined with the residual vitality of foundational cases such as Cherokee
68. Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hardwork: An Essay on Tribal
Court Jurisprudence, 1992 WiS. L. REv. 411 (1992).
69. Id. at 412 n.4.
70. Id. at 412-13.
71. Id. at411.
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Nation and Worcester that provide the necessary support, if not adequate
legal and constitutional theory, for tribal courts to identify and explore
the proper parameters of tribal sovereignty. These cases, of course,
guarantee no affirmation of the results-practical or theoretical-of tribal
court jurisprudence. 2
Philip P. Frickey, in Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the
Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law,73 also discussed these seminal
comity cases but in a different context than Pommersheim. Frickey sought
to paint federal Indian Law as a little understood facet of public law. He
explained that one major reason for the confusion is that the Supreme Court
has accorded Congress plenary power over Indian affairs and, because of
this, the doctrine would require the Court to follow Congressional intent in
deciding Indian law cases. Yet, Frickey illustrated that, in a variety of
important cases, the Court has subordinated original Congressional intent in
favor of more independent interpretations.74
Frickey noted that National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual "are
paradigms of practical reasoning and that may provide substantial
methodological guidance. 75 Frickey pointed out that in National Farmers
Union:
the Court sensibly concluded that, consistent with federal policy
encouraging tribal self-government, the tribal court should be the
institution that, in the first instance, considered whether it may appropri-
ately exercise jurisdiction in the circumstances. The Court acknowledged
that the tribal court was the more competent institution to consider the
traditional and contextual factors bearing on any such jurisdiction, and
that the exhaustion requirement also promoted the efficient administration
of justice.76
Iowa Mutual, wrote Frickey, is "particularly supportive of tribal courts,"
where the opinion concluded "that the federal district court must stay its
hand until tribal appellate review is complete. 77
Taken together, [both cases] represent an effective exercise of practical
reason.... The federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have very
little experience with the structure, operation, and outcomes of tribal
72. Id. at 420 (citations omitted).
73. Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137 (1990).
74. Id. at 1137.
75. Id. at 1232.
76. Id. at 1233.
77. Id. at 1234.
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court systems. Generalizing a formal theory of tribal court jurisdiction
might ignore important contextual differences. Essentially, the Supreme
Court has given tribal courts the chance to show that they can fairly and
effectively litigate civil disputes involving non-Indian defendants....
In this context, at least, at some point formalism may follow function.78
B. Treatises
William C. Canby, Jr., who has been extensively cited in this Article,
is the author of American Indian Law.79 Canby's treatment of the issue of
comity is clothed in a broad civil jurisdictional discussion, more broad than
what we want to entertain here. As it may relate to comity, however, Canby
does point out that many tribes are increasingly exercising jurisdiction over
non-Indians for on-reservation claims. For many years this was not done
unless the non-Indian stipulated to such jurisdiction."s Canby asserts that "it
seems likely ... that most tribal courts will be able to exercise jurisdiction
over non-Indians for reservation-based claims."81 The Doctrine of Comity
is all the more necessary in encouraging the tribal courts to continue
asserting themselves, albeit timidly, in furtherance of their judicial
development. Honoring notions of comity allows that jurisdictional
determination to be made in the first place by the court most qualified to
determine its jurisdiction: the tribal court. After all, tribal interests may vary,
and each tribe through its courts is the entity best suited to determine those
interests.
C. The Minority View
As this article presents, current case law represents the majority view.
Although there is apparently no true minority position, one can be inferred
from several sources.
Justice Stevens dissented from the exhaustion part of the Iowa Mutual
holding. The gist of his grievance with Justice Marshall's opinion is that
Justice Stevens felt that tribal courts receive more deference "on the merits"
than state courts. s2 He argued that where the tribal court and federal district
court have concurrent jurisdiction over the dispute, the question of whether
the tribal court has jurisdiction is not sufficient reason for requiring the
78. Id.
79. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW (West Publishing, Nutshell Series
(1988)).
80. CANBY, supra note 22, at 158.
81. CANBY, supra note 22, at 159.
82. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 20-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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federal court to decline exercising its own jurisdiction until the tribal court
has decided the case on its merits."3 Justice Stevens claims that National
Farmers Union offers no controlling precedent where the issue is the
deference given to the deliberations of tribal courts on the merits of a
dispute.
Comparing the federal-state and the federal-tribal relationships, Justice
Stevens stated that "the mere fact that a case involving the same issue...
pending in another court has never been considered a sufficient reason to
excuse a federal court from performing its duty 'to adjudicate a controversy
properly before it.""' In short, his dissent centered on his thought that it is
an "anomalous suggestion that the sovereignty of an Indian tribe is in some
respects greater than that of the State of Montana . . .,,"
It seems from the great weight of authority that Justice Stevens' dissent
has fallen on deaf ears, because the controlling case law in this narrow field
of federal Indian law is highly correlative, and strongly against his position.
IV. THE FIRST ISSUE
The first issue presented in the Introduction was to argue for the
development of tribal judiciaries. Essential to this argument, was an
understanding of sovereignty and comity.
Sovereignty for the Indian tribes within the United States is limited by
law and by virtue of their status, both as dependents and conquerees of the
United States. Although some authorities have argued that the sovereignty
of Indian tribes should be treated like the sovereignty of the individual
states, such a concept has met with little acceptance by the authorities which
would grant such a status: i.e., Congress and the Supreme Court. Thus, by
definition, the Indian tribes do not have sovereign rights equal to the
individual states.
As defined earlier, sovereignty is akin to power; power to act within
borders without being held accountable by a superior authority. As
acknowledged previously in this discussion, the Indian tribes have little
power or authority to adjudicate criminal matters. This limitation is
established by statute.86 By comparison, the states retain their criminal
jurisdiction under the Constitution. Further, by comparison, state sovereignty
83. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda
Co., 361 U.S. 855 (1959)).
85. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1988).
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is derived from the United States, whereas Indian nation sovereignty is
inherent.
However, by the decisions in National Farmers Union and Iowa
Mutual, the Supreme Court appears to have elevated the civil jurisdiction of
the Indian tribes to the same level as that enjoyed by the individual states,
at least concerning the interplay with the federal judiciary.
It should be noted that not only are the mechanisms for determining
jurisdiction different for tribes and states, but so is the scope of the power
of the tribal and state courts. For example, where an action in a state court
could be removed to the federal courts and vice versa, 7 the Indian courts
seem to have first say in determining jurisdiction, subject, of course, to
federal review. Thus, in one sense, the tribal courts have a greater scope of
power than the state courts. However, in either case, the result is ultimately
the same. The matter will eventually be adjudicated in the most appropriate
forum.
Comity, as previously discussed, is the granting of deference to another
authority, not by way of right, but as a matter of discretion. Up until the
decisions in National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, comity was a viable
way of viewing the relationship between the federal and tribal courts.
However, these decisions appear to have raised the process of deference
to tribal determination of jurisdiction to a principle of law. It may appear
that no longer is the granting of such deference a matter of discretion in the
federal courts, but it may be a requirement for the courts. The Tenth Circuit
Court was certainly not reticent about requiring the lower court to take such
factors into consideration.8"
In Smith v. Moffet, however, the Tenth Circuit noted that the consider-
ation of comity is not a jurisdictional bar.89 And, in Iowa Mutual, the
Supreme Court stated:
[t]he exhaustion rule enunciated in National Farmers Union did not
deprive the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction. Exhaustion is
required as a matter of comity, not as a jurisdictional prerequisite. In this
respect, the rule is analogous to principles of abstention articulated in
Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.
Ct. 1236... : even where there is concurrent jurisdiction in both state
and federal courts, deference to state proceedings renders it appropriate
for the federal courts to decline jurisdiction in certain circumstances.9"
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988).
88. Smith v. Moffet, 947 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1991).
89. Id. at 445.
90. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 16 n.8.
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Thus, once more, the relationship between the tribal courts and federal
courts appears to mirror the relations between state and federal courts.
Sovereignty and comity, with respect to the relationship between tribal
and federal courts, is very much like the relationship between state and
federal courts. However, the primary differences are: (1) the tribal courts
appear to have the first chance to determine jurisdiction and (2) the tribal
courts will be accorded a greater degree of deference because of their status
as semi-sovereign entities. Thus, it follows that as the Indian nations are
semi-sovereign entities, comity in tribal-federal judicial relations will be
given a greater degree of consideration and adherence than in state-federal
judicial relations.
Returning to the first issue, the argument for the development of tribal
judiciaries can only be strengthened when the federal policy of Indian self-
determination is considered. With the rejection of the assimilationist position
by the federal government, it is clear that federal policy mandates that the
tribes be considered as different from the states.
Thus, given the fact that the Indian tribes are semi-sovereign entities,
to be considered differently from the states, it is logical that tribal courts be
given a greater degree of deference in the determination of their jurisdiction.
Therefore, when considering tribal-federal questions, the federal judiciary is
subject to a standard which is higher than that of comity. Such a standard
approaches the level of a legal mandate.
Given such a conclusion, not only should tribal judiciaries be
developed, they must be developed. Without independent tribal judiciaries,
the entire federal policy of self-determination becomes meaningless.
V. A GUIDE FOR DETERMINING THE FORUM
Since the federal courts do, as a matter of law, retain the discretion to
hear a matter involving concurrent jurisdiction, where is the best forum to
file a claim?
A. The Location of the Event
Almost all Supreme Court decisions recognize, if only implicitly, Chief
Justice Marshall's decision in Worcester v. Georgia9 that, generally, Indian
nations have exclusive authority and jurisdiction within their boundaries. 92
If a civil wrong occurs on the reservation, then there will be a strong
91. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
92. Id.
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presumption in favor of the tribal court having the authority to adjudicate
the matter.93
B. The Parties Involved
In both National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, some of the parties
involved in the cases were non-Indians. Thus, there is implicit recognition
in Supreme Court decisions that the jurisdiction of tribal courts extends to
non-Indians. Further, in United States v. Wheeler, the Supreme Court stated
that tribal jurisdiction extends "'over both their members and their
territory."' '94 And, the Tenth Circuit went so far as to state that the status
of the parties was immaterial to the analysis.95 Thus, if at least one party is
an Indian or the matter occurred on the reservation, the tribal court will
likely have jurisdiction.
C. Limitations on Sovereignty
As previously stated, criminal jurisdiction is prohibited to tribal courts
and Congress has the power to limit the jurisdiction of the tribal courts.96
Thus, an attorney considering filing a claim involving Indians and claims
originating on reservations, must thoroughly research the statutes to ensure
that there are no federal limitations upon the claim. However, even if there
is a strong substantive federal claim, this does not mean that the tribal courts
would not have jurisdiction.97 Careful research on similar claims should be
conducted prior to filing.
D. Tribal Interests.
Of course, the specific interest that a tribe might have in a cause of
action must be analyzed. Each case discussed in this article examined the
interests of the tribe and considered those interests. The paramount tribal
interest to all such claims would be any possible encroachment upon the
sovereignty of that Indian nation. This interest arises from the stated federal
policy of encouraging tribal self-determination. Any encroachment upon the
93. Id. at 521.
94. COHEN, supra note 1, at 246 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23
(1978)).
95. Smith v. Moffett, 947 F.2d 442, 444 (10th Cir. 1991).
96. See Indian Major Crimes Act, supra note 86 and accompanying text.
97. See Smith v. Moffett, 947 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1991).
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already limited sovereignty of an Indian nation would, by definition, limit
that tribe's ability to develop as a semi-sovereign entity.
Further, tribal constitutions, statutes, and case law must be considered.
These instruments are the formal legal expression of tribal interests upon
which an opposing party would be able to object to a federal court
exercising jurisdiction, alleging that the tribe has a much greater interest in
adjudicating the matter.
E. Federal Interests
The attorney must determine if any federal interests are so strong as to
preclude the tribal court from hearing the matter. These potential federal
interests must be balanced against the tribal interests. The attorney must also
ask if these tribal interests would be sufficient to allow the federal court to
require the claimant to refile in tribal court.
F. An Objection on Principle
One objection that is likely to be raised by a party who is forced to go
to a tribal court is the issue of federal question jurisdiction. Is it proper to
require a United States citizen, who very well might not be a member of
that tribe and would be properly before the federal court with a federal
question, to go to a tribal court?
This objection is the essence of Justice Stevens's dissent in Iowa
Mutual. Is a tribal court's jurisdiction so important that it becomes a reason
for the federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction until the tribal
court has decided the case?
The stated policy of Congress, currently adhered to by the courts, of
enhancing tribal self-determination, is the root of this problem. The problem
has not been addressed by the courts to this date and resolution of it may
very well be determined according to the attitudes and politics of the circuit
judges which first hear the issue when it is raised.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the current federal policy of self-determination by Indian nations is
maintained, then the development of tribal judiciaries must be a primary step
in realization of this goal. Essential to the development of tribal judiciaries
as organs of inherently semi-sovereign entities, as opposed to the derivative
sovereignty of the states, is the quasi-independence of the tribal judiciaries,
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not subject to the discretion of the federal courts under the doctrine of
comity.
After all, the discretion associated with comity is the antithesis of
sovereignty when that discretion is used to suborn decisions within the
sovereign authority of the primary adjudicator. Even though the principle of
self-determination may not comfortably juxtapose with this notion of limited
sovereignty and discretionary comity, elevating comity to the level of
mandate might be a better compromise.
